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I. INTRODUCTION
In light of the recent wave of environmentally-inspired protests against the
lowering of trade barriers, it is particularly ironic that United States protectionism
is, in at least one instance, resulting in catastrophic environmental damage. The
Florida Everglades, designated by the United Nations as a World Heritage Site,'
is critically endangered by the South Florida sugar industry.2 Oddly, though,
growing sugar in South Florida makes no economic sense. It has taken decades of
heavy-handed protectionism to make the sugar plantations of Florida possible.
Americans currently pay significantly more for their sugar than do consumers
in the rest of the world. The artificially high prices in the United States are
supported by a complex system of direct and indirect subsidies, tariffs, and
non-tariff barriers. This government intervention in support of the price of a
single fungible commodity benefits a very small number of United States sugar
* Professor of Law and Director of Center for Global Legal Studies, Thomas Jefferson School of Law; J.D.,
Berkeley (Boalt Hall) 1989; e-mail aarons@tjsl.edu.
1. Everglades National Park, United Nations Educational, Cultural and Scientific Organization, at http://
www.unesco.org/whc/sites/76.htm (last updated June 20, 2000).
2. As used in this article, "sugar" means sucrose derived from sugar cane or sugar beets. The Harmonized
Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS) lists sucrose in chapter 17, along with glucose, fructose, lactose,
and maltose. U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, PUB. No. 3378, HARMONIZED TARIFF SCHEDULE OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 1701, 1702 (2001) [hereinafter HTSUS]. Syrups containing these sugars are listed in chapter 21. HTSUS
§ 2106.90.42. Some chemically pure sugars are also listed in chapter 29.
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producers. As a direct consequence of this support, enormous damage has been
and continues to be inflicted upon the irreplaceable natural resources of the
Everglades and Florida Bay.
The remedy is absurdly simple: the United States should drop its tariffs on
imported sugar to more reasonable levels, and should eliminate all non-tariff
barriers. The sugar producers of South Florida, who enjoy no natural competitive
advantage, will fade away.3 Alternate uses will be found for the land and water
resources of South Florida, few of which are likely to be as environmentally
destructive as sugar production. Given the tremendous influence that the sugar
producers seem to enjoy in Washington, they will probably be able to convince
the government to purchase some or all of their land, at or above market value,
for incorporation into Everglades National Park. This potential resolution would
present a large but non-recurring cost, with tangible environmental benefits. The
political benefits would be significant as well, as environmentalists would be
delighted and agribusiness interests at least mollified. There would also be
economic benefits, as consumers would divert the extra money now spent on
overpriced sugar to other, more productive uses.
This article will examine the role of the federal government in the destruction
of the Everglades. Part II.A examines the creation of the Florida sugar cane
industry, while Part 11.B discusses the continuing role of the government in
subsidizing the continuing operation of the industry. Part III concludes that the
extreme market distortion created by government interference has proved disas-
trous for the Everglades environment, and that the only hope for the survival of
the Everglades lies in dismantling the existing protectionist regime and allowing
market mechanisms to function.
II. THE EVERGLADES AND THE SUGAR INDUSTRY
The Everglades is a unique and fragile environmental system, home to
hundreds of species of plants and animals. Human activities over the past century
have already wreaked enormous devastation on the Everglades; the popular
image of the Everglades as a "river of grass" is itself the result of a loss of
biodiversity, opening ecological niches to be filled by sawgrass.4 As early as
1929, scientists were lamenting "the wholesale devastation of the plant
3. See, e.g., Paul Roberts, The Sweet Hereafter: Our Craving for Sugar Starves the Everglades and Fattens
Politicians, HARPER'S, Nov. 1, 1999, at 54, 65 ("For when all is said and done, America, even semitropical
America, is simply not the best place to grow cane sugar, and it shows. Whereas United States cane producers
spend U.S. $375 producing a metric ton of raw sugar, Australians, with their better soils and climate and greater
investment in breeding, milling, and shipping technologies, spend just U.S. $255 per ton."). See also Katherine
E. Monahan, Note, U.S. Sugar Policy: Domestic and International Repercussions of Sour Law, 15 HASTINGS
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 325, 339 (1992) ("[T]he United States is an inefficient and high cost sugar producer
when compared to many Third World sugar exporting countries.").
4. See, e.g., DAVID MCCALLY, THE EVERGLADES: AN ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY 176, 179-80 (1999);
MARJORIE STONEMAN DOUGLAS, EVERGLADES: RIVER OF GRASS (1947).
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covering, through carelessness, thoughtlessness, and vandalism in the Peninsular
State[.],,
5
Administratively, the Everglades can be roughly divided into three areas. The
southern part, where the Everglades flows into Florida Bay, lies largely within
Everglades National Park. The northern part contains the Everglades' headwa-
ters: Lake Okeechobee and the lands of the Everglades Agricultural Area (EAA)
to the south and southeast.6 The central part contains the Water Conservation
Areas, which serve as reservoirs for South Florida's urban areas and receive
excess water discharged from the EAA.7
Two human activities threaten the Everglades above all others: agriculture and
urban development. Of the two, agriculture is the more destructive and the more
easily addressed. The bulk of the land in the EAA is farmed by just two
companies, United States Sugar and the Fanjul family's Flo-Sun Corporation and
associated companies. These two entities produce a crop readily available from
other, albeit foreign, suppliers at lower prices: sugar.
A. GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION TO CREATE AN AGRICULTURAL INDUSTRY
IN THE EVERGLADES
Sugar production has a short but brutal history in Florida. Agriculture's assault
on the Everglades began in 1918 with the completion of the Florida East Coast
Railway to Moore Haven.8 Early would-be settlers found the land difficult to
clear, and after cutting the existing growth, set fire to it. The peaty soils of the
Everglades are flammable, however, and in many cases the soil eventually burned
down to the underlying rock, leaving a desert useless for agriculture. 9 Even when
the land could be successfully cleared and planted, crops failed and cattle died
because of a scarcity of trace elements in the soil.1° Winter frosts and summer
heat also killed truck crops."'
Over the long term, however, the greatest threat to agriculture in the Ever-
glades was inadequate drainage.1 2 Flooding caused by the 1926 hurricane
5. JOHN KutKEL SMALL, FROM EDEN TO SAHARA: FLORIDA'S TRAGEDY (1929) (containing several dramatic
before-and-after photographs of environmental destruction).
6. Loxahatchee National Wildlife Refuge, lying east of the EAA and northeast of Water Conservation Area
2A, hydrologically belongs more to the central Everglades than to the headwaters.
7. For a more complete discussion of the complex network of state and federal administrative entities with
authority over the Everglades, see Thomas T. Ankersen & Richard Hamann, Ecosystem Management and the
Everglades: A Legal and Institutional Analysis, 11 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 473 (1996).
8. MCCALLY, supra note 4, at 121. A line to Okeechobee City had been completed by the Florida East Coast
Railway in 1915, for the purpose of transporting fish from the Lake Okeechobee fisheries to market. Id. at
120-21.
9. Id. at 121-23.
10. Id. at 125.
11. Id. at 126.
12. See generally id. at 131-40.
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claimed more than 300 lives in the area around Moore Haven, and destroyed
existing flood-control works.' 3 In the aftermath of the flood, it became apparent
that the residents of the Everglades Drainage District, who by then lived largely
by agriculture, could not afford adequate flood control. 14 At this point a rational,
market-based response would have been to conclude that the proceeds from
agriculture in the area could not exceed the cost of making the land safe and
suitable for agriculture, and to allow the land to return to a natural state.
Instead, the federal government stepped in, creating the expensive and ecologi-
cally disastrous Hoover Dike around the southern shore of Lake Okeechobee and
turning over control of most drainage projects to the Army Corps of Engineers. 15
The Corps of Engineers created a network of drainage canals to lower water
levels. Since the peat soils of the Everglades are largely water, lowering the level
of fresh water created problems of saltwater intrusion, soil fires, and soil
subsidence. 16 In Moore Haven, for example, thirteen years of agriculture resulted
in a subsidence of "approximately 45 per cent of the original depth of the soil."
' 17
During the Depression, though, Everglades drainage control represented a way
to bring needed federal dollars and jobs into Florida. Even if the state government
had possessed the will or the common sense to abandon the idea of making the
Everglades into farmland, the federal government was providing a financial
counterincentive to economic and ecological good sense. At the same time, the
general unprofitability of Everglades farming and the economic collapse of
family farming during the late 1920s and early 1930s allowed a few large
landowners to take over much of the agricultural land south of Lake Okeechobee.
By 1929, the Southern Sugar Company controlled over 100,000 acres of this
land; by 1940 its successor, U.S. Sugar, produced eighty-six percent of the
region's sugar.1 8
Labor conditions on U.S. Sugar's plantations during this time approached
those associated with slavery. 19 In this, as in almost every phase of sugar's
development in the Everglades, the growers were assisted by the federal govern-
ment. Locals refused to work on the plantations, a sure sign that the local labor
market required higher wages and better working conditions. Using taxpayers'
dollars, however, the United States Employment Service recruited workers from
other areas of the South, presenting them with "the impression that a cane cutter's
13. Id. at 134-35.
14. See id. at 131.
15. Id. at 130-31.
16. Id. at 138.
17. Id. at 136.
18. Id. at 161. Ironically, from 1925 to 1931 the primary goal of Southern Sugar was not to supply sugar but
to supply bagasse, the remnants of sugar cane after the sugar has been extracted. The bagasse was used in the
manufacture of Celotex. Id.
19. See id. at 165-68; see also ZoRA NEALE HURSTON, THEIR EYEs WERE WATCHING GOD 108 (1937).
[Vol. 14:30i
FREE TRADE AND THE EVERGLADES
life was one of comfort and luxury."2 0
By 1942, U.S. Sugar's abuses led to its indictment for peonage in violation of
the Thirteenth Amendment.2  The indictment charged, inter alia, that a U.S.
Sugar supervisor had captured three workers who attempted to escape and
forcibly returned them to the plantation. 22 Although the indictment was eventu-
ally dismissed,23 the mere fact that it had been brought, and the success of a
separate case challenging Florida's debt peonage laws,24 made it evident that the
age of widespread corporate near-enslavement of Americans was drawing to a
close.25 Once again, rather than compete in the labor market, U.S. Sugar sought
the assistance of the federal government. From 1943 until 1995, workers from the
Caribbean were brought to Florida sugar plantations on temporary visas, where
they worked under the constant threat of deportation.26 During World War II and
until the end of 1947, the federal government directly negotiated employment
contracts with these workers and paid the cost of round-trip transportation, a
fairly substantial subsidy.2 7
During World War II, the United States labor market was tight, while
unemployment in the Caribbean countries was high. There was thus a certain
rationality to the arrangement. At least one Caribbean island with high unemploy-
ment was not involved in the program, though as one official pointed out,
workers from Puerto Rico were less desirable to sugar growers, because they
could not be "deported and sent home, if it does not work.
28
The temporary worker program outlasted World War H by half a century.2 9 The
labor system continued with many of its old abuses. In one 1986 incident, for
example, police dogs were set on workers protesting low wages; immediately
afterwards, 300 protestors were deported and replaced with new workers. 30 The
20. McCALLY, supra note 4, at 167 (quoting a contemporary newspaper account).
21. Id. at 167-68.
22. Id. at 168.
23. Id. at 168.
24. Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4 (1944).
25. For a horrifying account of corporate slavery in the pre-World War H South, see generally Douglas A.
Blackmon, Hard Times: From Alabama's Past, Capitalism and Racism in A Cruel Partnership, WALL ST. J.,
July 16, 2001, at Al, available at 2001 WL-WSJ 2869638 and Douglas A. Blackmon, Uncle Martin's Tale: He
Was Sent to Prison at 33 and Never Returned, WALL ST. J., at A10, available at 2001 WL-WSJ 2869627.
26. See generally MCCALLY, supra note 4, at 168-69.
27. MCCALLY, supra note 4, at 169.
28. MCCALLY, supra note 4, at 168-69.
29. Id. at 169. This sort of longevity in "temporary" government measures is nothing new, of course. For
example, the infamous Spanish-American War telephone tax has outlasted the eight-month war by more than a
century. Although a measure to repeal it passed the House by 420 votes to 3 last year and was subsequently
favorably recommended by the Senate Finance Committee, it seems unlikely to be enacted. See S. REP. No.
106-328 (2nd Sess. 2000); H. R. REP. No. 106-631 (2nd Sess. 2000); Janet Hook, Dip in Surplus Cures Capitols
Tax Cut Fever, L.A. TIMES, July 18, 2001, at A 1, available at 2001 WL 2503930.
30. Id. at 169-70.
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program ended only when lawsuits by underpaid cane workers 3' and the
decreasing cost of mechanization had made it unprofitable for growers. One
attorney representing the Fanjul family in suits brought by workers explained that
"[m]achines are cheaper, they're more efficient, and they rarely sue.",
32
The greatest harm to the Everglades ecosystem is done by through drainage.
Sugar production also harms the Everglades through habitat destruction and
through run-off of agricultural chemicals. Biochemical oxidation of muck soils
leads to increased nutrient discharge, in turn leading to eutrophication of the
Everglades and Florida Bay.33 All agriculture in the EAA contributes to these
problems to some extent, but sugar is the biggest culprit.
Ironically, sugar became the EAA's largest crop because of the man South
Florida loves to hate: Fidel Castro. From the time of the Spanish-American War
to the Cuban revolution, Cuban sugar (much of it from American-owned fields)
enjoyed preferential treatment.34 After July 1960, the United States imported no
sugar from Cuba; Cuba's quota (at that time 98.6% of the world total) was
revoked in retaliation for Cuban nationalization of American-owned property.35
The ban on Cuban sugar imports can be seen as one of the many covert subsidies
to Everglades sugar producers, although in this case the subsidy was more or less
incidental to the foreign policy goal.
B. THE SUGAR PRICE SUPPORT REGIME
The draining of the EAA, at the expense of the taxpayers of the United States,
was the first large direct subsidy from the federal government to the sugar
growers. The role of the federal government in providing a cheap and compliant
labor force was another. Its direct dollar value is the difference between what the
sugar companies actually paid for labor during the five decades of the guest
worker program and the preceding years of United States Employment Service
assistance, and what it would have paid for the same amount of labor in the
absence of government assistance.
These measures served to keep growers' costs low. Over the last two
decades, a protectionist quota/tariff regime and loan program have also kept
sugar prices high. The price support regime, itself only a part of the total
system of subsidies to Everglades sugar growers, is a structure of truly
31. See, e.g., Rosalind Resnick, Cane Cleanup, NAT'L L.J., May 13, 1991, at 6; Rosalind Resnick, $50
Million Win for Cane Cutters, NAT'L L.J., July 13, 1992, at 3; Margaret Cronin Fisk, A Sour Verdict for Cane
Cutters: A Florida Jury Finds for a Sugar Company But Calls It "Shameful, " NAT'L L. J., July 17, 1999, at
B-11.
32. Rosalind Resnick, $50 Million Win for Cane Cutters, NAT'L L.J., July 13, 1992, at 3.
33. McCALLY, supra note 4, at 172.
34. See Monahan, supra note 3, at 353.
35. Monahan, supra note 3, at 353; see also Roberts, supra note 3, at 59. The Soviet Union picked up the
slack to some extent, but since 1989 sugar production in Cuba has been steadily decreasing.
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astonishing complexity. For those who appreciate administrative complexity
for its own sake, it is a work of art.3 6 The price support system has two main
components: a loan program that guarantees a support price of eighteen cents
per pound for cane sugar produced in the United States, and a tariff/quota
regime that prevents world prices from being reflected in United States
markets by excluding foreign competitors.
1. The Loan Program
There are more direct subsidies, as well. The U.S. Department of Agriculture
loans money to sugar farmers through its Commodity Credit Corporation
(CCC). 37 The CCC makes both "recourse" and "nonrecourse" loans. Recourse
loans are straightforward business loans, with the borrower responsible for
repayment of all money borrowed.3 8 When imports in a given fiscal year reach
1.5 million tons, nonrecourse loans also become available. Nonrecourse loans are
actually a commodity purchase program, giving borrowers the option to "sell"
the sugar at a set price. Nonrecourse loans are secured only by the sugar pledged
as collateral; forfeiture of the sugar satisfies the loan, even if the value of the
sugar is less than the value of the money borrowed.39 Forfeiture of collateral
during a crop year carries a penalty of one cent per pound, but does not disqualify
a borrower from receiving additional loans in subsequent years.4 °
Although most CCC nonrecourse loans are made to growers, sugar loans are
made to processors, because sugar cane and sugar beets must be processed before
they can be stored. However, to receive the loans, processors must purchase sugar
cane and sugar beets from farmers at set support prices. In the case of U.S. Sugar,
at least, there is sufficient vertical integration that the distinction between grower
and processor is irrelevant.
4 '
The nonrecourse loans thus function as a price support program, guaranteeing
farmers a minimum price for their crop. The price of raw cane sugar is supported
by the nonrecourse loans at eighteen cents per pound; 42 the price of refined beet
36. For a comprehensive history of the program from the Sugar Tariff of 1789 (Tariff Act of 1789, ch. 2, 1
Stat. 24) through 1992, see Monahan, supra note 3.
37. See generally 7 C.F.R. § 1435 (2001); Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996, § 156,
Pub. L. 104-127, Apr. 4, 1996, 110 Stat. 888 [hereinafter Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of
1996]; 7 U.S.C.A. § 1421 (e)(2) (1999); 7 U.S.C.A. § 1446 (1999). The CCC is chartered under 15 U.S.C.A. §
714 (1999).
38. See 7 C.F.R. § 1435.2 (2001).
39. Id.
40. See 7 C.F.R. § 1435.106(b)(3)(i) (2001). Sugar on which debt has been repaid may even be pledged as
collateral for a second loan during the same crop year. See 7 C.F.R. § 1435(d) (2001).
41. See Roberts, supra note 3, at 54-56, 63-64 (describing the opening of U.S. Sugar's refinery in Clewiston,
Florida).
42. 7 C.F.R. § 1435.102(a) (2001).
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sugar is supported at 22.9 cents per pound.4 3 By comparison, raw cane sugar
outside the United States sells for about eight cents a pound.
44
If the sugar price in the United States falls below the support level, the sugar
standing as collateral for the loans can be forfeited, leaving the government with
sugar that the market doesn't want. 45 This happened on a large scale last year:
46
In 1999, because of overproduction, sugar prices in the United States dropped to
eighteen cents per pound. By June 2000, the CCC was buying sugar at twenty
cents per pound to support sugar prices.47 The federal government then provided
a payment-in-kind (PIK) program, as yet another bailout to the sugar industry.48
Under the PIK program, sugar farmers could remove a portion of their crop from
production and receive in exchange sugar warehoused by the government. The
maximum PIK payment to any farmer would be the equivalent of U.S. $20,000 in
sugar. The PIK program would thus provide only limited direct benefit to the two
giant Everglades sugar growers; rather, it was designed to help smaller sugar-beet
farmers. As part of a continuing program of price supports, though, the PIK helps
Everglades growers by continuing to ensure an inflated price for their output.
2. The Quota/Tariff Regime
Restrictive quotas on sugar imports keep prices high, so that Americans often
pay twice the world price for sugar. For years prior to the overproduction crisis of
1999-2000, growers were able to sell raw cane sugar for 22.5 cents per pound, 4.5
cents above the support price.49
Prior to 1982, the United States still imported about half of its sugar.5 ° Sugar
43. The discrepancy reflects the fact that refined beet sugar requires less additional refining before it can be
marketed. 7 C.F.R. § 1435.102(b) (2001).
44. Cash Prices, WALL ST. J., August 13, 2001, at C12. The world cash price for raw cane sugar was 8.49
cents/lb on Friday, August 10, down from 11.19 cents one year earlier. See also note 75, infra, and
accompanying text.
45. See, e.g., Editorial: Sugar Industry.. .Sweet Deal for Growers Is a Toothache for the Public, NAPLES
(FLA.) DAILY NEWS, Oct. 11, 2000. In 1985, for example, 430,000 tons of sugar were forfeited, which the United
States eventually sold to China for five cents per pound.
46. By mid-2001, loan forfeitures had left the United States in ownership of over one million tons of sugar,
stored at a cost of U.S. $1.4 million per month. Judy Sanchez, Sugar Industry Faces Big Test with Free Trade,
SAINT PETERSBURG (FLA.) TIMES, May 6, 2001, available at http://www.sptimes.com/News/050601/Business/
Sugarindustry.faces..shtml (last visited Sept. 20, 2001) [hereinafter Sugar Industry Faces Big Test].
47. Id.
48. See U.S. Announces Payment-in-Kind Program for Sugar, SUGAR NEWS, Aug. 22, 2000, available at
http://www.sugar.ca/22Aug00Prt.htm (last visited August 11, 2001); see also Editorial, Cut the Sugar Tax,
WASH. POST, Aug. 11, 2000, at A24.
49. Daniel Fisher, Sticky Situation, FORBES, May 14, 2001, at 64.
50. See, e.g., GATT Secretariat Panel Report, United States: Restrictions on the Import of Sugar and Sugar
Containing Products Applied under the 1955 Waiver and under the Headnote to the Schedule of Tariff
Concessions, at 20-22, GAIT Doc. I/6331-37S/228, Jan. 22, 1990 (adopted Nov. 7, 1990), available at 1990
WL 692208 [hereinafter GATT Report (1990)].
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imports had risen from 3.7 million short tons 5 1 in 195552 to 6.1 million short tons
by 1977. 53 During the 1980s the Reagan administration, ostensibly committed to
free trade and market solutions, oversaw a tightening of the quota/tariff regime.
54
Imports continued to average about five million short tons per year through
1981,55 but by 1987 had fallen to just over one million short tons.
56
The current quota/tariff portion of the overall price support system is itself
extraordinarily complex. It keeps prices high by restricting the entry of sugar
imports, preventing foreign sugar from competing with domestically produced
sugar. Defenders of subsidies point out that at the same time that United States
subsidies artificially inflate the U.S. price, the actions of other governments
(especially within the European Union) artificially deflate the world price. A
free-market price would still be lower than the U.S. price.57 In addition, the quota
scheme does not serve to counteract these subsidies; antidumping and countervail-
ing duties against several countries serve this purpose.58
Presidential Proclamation 6179 sets out the basic framework of the current
quota/tariff regime. 59 It sets up a two-tiered tariff system, replacing the previous
absolute quota system. This change, although largely cosmetic, was mandated by
the obligations of the United States under the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade.6°
51. In the English system of measurement, a short ton is equal to 2,000 pounds. A long ton is equal to 2,240
pounds. Prior to 1988, quota allocations in the HTSUS were measured in short tons; since the beginning of that
year the allocations have been measured in metric tons, or tonnes. One metric ton is equal to 2204.623 pounds,
or just over 1.1 short tons. See id. at 34 n. 4; THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 2001 560-61 (William
A. McGeveran, Jr. et al., eds. 2001).
52. GATT Report (1990), supra note 50, at 20, para. 4.1.
53. Id. at 22, para. 4.10.
54. See Pub. L. No. 97-98, 95 Stat. 1213, 1257 (requiring the Secretary of Agriculture to establish a price
support program); Proclamation No. 4941, 47 Fed. Reg. 19,661 (1982) (limiting imports to 220,000 short tons).
Proclamation 4941 was unsuccessfully challenged by domestic sugar refiners in United States Cane Sugar
Refiners' Association v. Block, 544 F Supp 883 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1982), aff'd, 683 F.2d 399 (C.C.P.A. 1982). See
also Proclamation 5071, 48 Fed. Reg. 30,089 (1983); Proclamation No. 5294, 50 Fed. Reg. 4187 (1985);
Proclamation No. 5340, 50 Fed. Reg. 20,881 (1985).
55. GATT Report (1990), supra note 50, at 20, para. 4.1.
56. GATT Report (1990), supra note 50, at 20, para. 4.1, and 22, para. 4.10; see also Monahan, supra note 3,
at 334, 336-37.
57. Artificial oversupply in the United States also drives the world price down, since in the absence of that
oversupply the United States would buy sugar from other countries.
58. Antidumping duties have been imposed against Belgium, Canada, France, and Germany. Countervailing
duties have been imposed against Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, and the
United Kingdom. U.S. CUSTOMS SERV., WHAT EVERY MEMBER OF THE TRADE COMMUNrrY SHOULD KNow
ABOUT CANE AND BEET SUGAR: QUOTA, CLASSIFICATION AND ENTRY 13 (2000).
59. Proclamation No. 6179, Sept. 13, 1990. See 15 C.F.R. §§ 2011, 2015 (2001); 19 C.F.R. § 132.17 (2001).
The previous protectionist measure, the Sugar Act of 1948, 61 Stat. 922, expired in 1974. It was then replaced by
Proclamation No. 4334, 39 Fed. Reg. 40,739 (Nov. 20, 1974). See also 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 624, 1359, 1359aa-jj,
1446 (1999); 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 1202, 3511 (1999).
60. See Proclamation No. 6179, supra note 59, para. 4; GAT'T Report (1990), supra note 50, at 34, para. 6.1.
See also, Monahan, supra note 3, at 335 ("The form, but not the substance, of United States import protection
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In addition to being strictly limited in quantity, sugar imports are also taxed.61
Raw cane sugar from most countries imported within the quota is taxed at
between .94 and 1.46 cents per kilogram; 62 beet sugar from these countries is
taxed at 3.14 to 3.66 cents per kilogram, as is cane sugar containing added
coloring matter.63 The exact amount of the tariff depends on the polarity6 of the
sugar. Cane and beet sugar from Canada, Mexico and a few other countries
imported within the quota is not taxed at all.65 One of these countries is the
Dominican Republic. Half of the sugar producing capacity in the Dominican
Republic, and thus half of that country's import quota, belongs to the Fanjul
family.66 Raw cane sugar imported within the quota (if any) from the handful of
countries that do not enjoy what used to be called "most favored nation"
treatment is taxed at a much steeper 2.83 to 4.38 cents per kilogram, while beet
sugar from these countries is taxed at between 5.03 and 6.58 cents per kilo.
6 7
Cane sugar imported in excess of the quota limits is taxed at 18.26 to 28.25
cents per kilo (for sugar from Mexico), 33.87 cents per kilo (for sugar from most
other countries), and 39.85 cents per kilo (from a handful of countries). 68 These
tariffs are often greater than the value of the sugar itself, and effectively prohibit
the import of sugar in excess of the quotas. Beet sugar in excess of the quota is
taxed at the same rate as cane sugar if originating in Mexico, at 35.74 cents for
most other countries, and at 42.05 cents per kilo for the handful of least-favored
69nations.
These direct subsidies cost American consumers nearly U.S. $2 billion dollars
was altered by the Presidential Proclamation of September 13, 1990."). For a discussion of sugar subsidies and
international law, see generally Marjorie Lister, The Functioning of Lomi 1I, 16 J. WORLD TRADE L. 4343
(1982); Ian Smith, Prospects for a New International Sugar Agreement, 17 J. WORLD TRADE L. 308 (1983);
Vincent A. Mahler, The Political Economy of North-South Commodity Bargaining: The Case of the Interna-
tional SugarAgreement, 38 INT'L ORG. 709 (1984); Ian Smith, UNCTAD: Failure of the UN Sugar Conference,
19 J. WORLD TRADE L. 296 (1985); Betty Ruth Fox, Comment, Interaction of the Caribbean Basin Initiative and
U.S. Domestic Sugar Price Support: A Political Contradiction, 8 Miss. C. L. REV. 197 (1988).
61. Despite the price difference, the United States imported only 1.8 million tons of sugar in 1999, while
producing 8.4 million tons domestically. Bill Walsh, Smart or Smuggling?, NEW ORLEANS TiMES-PICAYuNE,
Apr. 30, 2000, at Fl, available at 2000 WL 6559915.
62. One kilogram is equal to approximately 2.2 pounds, so 1.46 cents/kilo is about .66 cents/pound, a not
insignificant amount.
63. HTSUS §§ 1701.12.05, 1701.12.10 (2001).
64. The quality of sugar is measured with an optical device called a polarimeter. The polarimeter is used to
determine the optical rotation, or rotation of polarization, of light passing through the sugar. For a more
thorough explanation of polarimetry, see Andreas W. Dreher and Qienyuan Zhou, Scanning Laser Tomography
and Polarimetry of the Human Eye, OSA/IS&T's OPTICS & IMAGING IN THE INFORMATION AGE, Oct. 1996, at
129.
65. HTSUS §§ 1701.11, 1701.12.
66. Roberts, supra note 3, at 59-60.
67. HTSUS §§ 1701.11, 1701.12.
68. HTSUS § 1701.11.50.
69. HTSUS §§ 1701.12.50.
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per year.70 In addition to propping up the sugar-cane industry, they have created a
still-expanding sugar-beet industry."' The United States enjoys no particular
competitive advantage in the production of sugar beets, yet the existing protec-
tionist regime is luring farmers into an industry that, as soon as the price supports
are removed, must surely fail.72 One sugar processor says "The U.S. sugar
program is the most efficient tax we have... It comes directly from the
consumers and goes directly to the growers, who turn around and give some of
the money to the politicians., 73 Similarly, an editorial in the Washington Post
declares, "Billions of dollars have been transferred to producers, but the money
hasn't been sluiced through the Treasury. Rather, the public has paid at the
checkout counter.",74 This hidden tax is also regressive, since lower-income
families spend a proportionately higher amount of their income on food.
a. A Challenge to the Regime: Heartland By-Products
On August 10, 2001, the world price for sugar was 7.65 cents per pound on the
New York Coffee, Sugar and Cocoa Exchange; the domestic price was 21.16
cents per pound. 75 Such a situation cries out for arbitrage. In the mid-1990s, a
Michigan company called Heartland By-Products stepped forward to fill the
niche. Heartland, a subsidiary of British conglomerate ED & F Man, buys sugar
cane in Brazil and ships it to Windsor, Ontario, just across the Canadian border
from Detroit.76 In Windsor the sugar cane is processed to produce a thick
molasses-like syrup.77 This is trucked to Heartland's Michigan plant, where it is
further refined to produce sugar syrup, which Heartland then sells for use in
candy, ice cream, and cereal.78
70. Sugar Industry Faces Big Test, supra note 46. The General Accounting Office puts the cost to consumers
at U.S. $1.9 billion. Id. From 1982 to 1985, the subsidies cost consumers U.S. $3.7 billion per year. Monahan,
supra note 3, at 343.
71. Sugar beet production is expanding at 4% per year. Fisher, supra note 49.
72. See Fisher, supra note 49 ("It is a terrible waste of energy to grow sugar in Minnesota, but Congress pays
you to do it.").
73. Id. The connection between Florida sugar growers and politicians was satirized in Carl Hiaasen's novel
Strip Tease; the satire, although somewhat less biting, was still present in the movie version, starring Demi
Moore: STRIP TEASE (CASTLE ROCK ENTERTAINMENT 1996). On the periodic renewal of the Farm Bill, Hiaasen
writes:
Every few years, the Congress of the United States of America voted generous price supports for a
handful of agricultural millionaires in the great state of Florida. The crop that made them millionaires
was sugar, the price of which was grossly inflated and guaranteed by the United States government.
This brazen act of plunder accomplished two things: it kept American growers very wealthy, and it
undercut the struggling economies of poor Caribbean nations...
CARL HIAASEN, STRIP TEASE 13 (1993).
74. Editorial: Cut the Sugar Tax, WASH. POST, Aug. 11, 2000, at A24.
75. Futures Prices, WALL ST. J., August 13, 2001, at C12.
76. Walsh, supra note 61.
77. Id.
78. Sugar Solution, ECONOMIST, Apr. 22, 2000, at 58.
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In 1995, before Heartland began its syrup-import business, the U.S. Customs
Service had assured Heartland that its syrup was not covered by sugar restric-
tions. 79 Heartland began its imports in 1997. Sugar producers were outraged;
John Breaux (D-Louisiana), a senator often identified with sugar interests,8
accused Heartland of "smuggling sugar into the country in the form of molas-
ses." 8' This was more or less true, of course, in that Heartland's syrup was
designed to circumvent the protectionist sugar-import restrictions. It was not,
however, illegal, and was a natural response to the price inequity. The United
States Beet-Sugar Association petitioned Customs to reclassify the sugar syrup.
82
No fewer than twenty-six United States senators, including John Breaux and both
of Michigan's senators (Michigan is a major producer of sugar beets), signed a
letter urging Customs to reverse its earlier ruling. 83 Together, the twenty-six
senators received U.S. $528,322 in contributions from the sugar industry between
1995 and 2000.84
In mid-1999, Customs did reverse its earlier ruling, stating that "the classifica-
tion set forth [in the earlier ruling] is not correct [and] no longer reflects the views
of the Customs Service. 85 The new rule, which would have shut down Heart-
land's business, was to have taken effect on November 8, 1999.86 On October 19,
1999, the Court of International Trade (CIT) found that the imminent closing of
Heartland constituted an immediate danger of irrevocable injury.87 Further, it
found that, because molasses in sugar syrup is not a "foreign substance" within
the meaning of section 1702.90 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United
States (HTSUS),88 Customs acted improperly in changing its earlier determination,
79. Heartland By-Products, Inc. v. United States, 74 F. Supp. 2d 1324, 1326-27 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1999).
80. Senator Breaux received U.S. $32,050 in campaign contributions from the sugar industry in 1998, more
than any other Senator or Congressperson. Mia Rabson, Taylor Sugar Company Engaged in Bitter Battle: U.S.
Industry Claims Firm Evades Trade Tariff, DETRorT NEWS, Sept. 29, 2000, at 1, available at 2000 WL 3493246
[hereinafter Rabson, Bitter Battle].
81. Sugar Solution, supra note 78. For Senator Breaux's recipe for beignets, which use plenty of sugar, see
John Breaux, Specialty Recipe, New Orleans Beignets, at http://www.virtualcities.com/ons/la/gov/lagjbl.htm
(last visited Sept. 20, 2001). The recipe is on the Senate web page, but loads very slowly, at www.senate.gov/
-breaux/recip.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2001).
82. Heartland By-Products, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 1328-29.
83. See Jonathan D. Salant, Small Michigan Company Takes on Sugar Industry Titans, AP NEWSwIRE, Apr.
13, 2000 (copy on file with author); see also Editorial, Congress: Don't Play Sugar Daddy, DETRorr NEWS, June
20, 2000, at 8, available at 2000 WL 3481863.
84. Salant, supra note 83. Similarly, eleven senators visited the Secretary of Agriculture in 2000 to push for a
bailout of sugar producers. Bruce Ingersoll, Big Sugar Seeks Bailout, Gives Money to Help Get Way, WALL ST.
J., Apr. 27, 2000, at A28, available at 2000 WL-WSJ 3027193.
85. U.S. Customs Service, General Notice: Proposed Revocation of Ruling Letter and Treatment Relating to
Tariff Classification of Certain Sugar Syrups, Attachment B, available at http://www.customs.gov/imp-expl/
modrev/h961273p.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2001).
86. Heartland By-Products, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 1329.
87. Id. at 1332.
88. See HTSUS § 1702.90 (2000).
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and the syrup was properly classified under 1702.90.40 HTSUS.89 Finally, it held
that Heartland had not engaged in artifice or deceitful conduct in obtaining the
initial Customs determination. 90 Accordingly, the court found the revised Cus-
toms ruling was "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, and otherwise not
in accordance with law."9 1
Rule 59 of the rules of the CIT permits a party to move for reconsideration of
an adverse determination,92 and the United States Beet Sugar Association did so.
The CIT denied the motion, finding that its original decision was not flawed or
erroneous. 93 The defendants have naturally been reluctant to appeal the decision,
since the decision would probably be affirmed on appeal, seriously damaging Big
Sugar's position in future lawsuits. The matter has proceeded no further in the
courts, and the two Heartland decisions are thus chiefly of interest to specialists in
the rather arcane field of customs law,9 4 and to those interested in sugar. They
have not attracted nearly as much attention from environmentalists as they
should.
Senator Breaux and his supporters have not abandoned their crusade against
what they call "stuffed molasses." Senator Breaux has twice tried to amend the
existing tariff regime to exclude Heartland's syrup, first as a rider to the
Africa-Caribbean Basin Initiative trade bill 95 and later as a rider to a community-
renewal bill.96
b. Protectionism, NAFTA, and the WTO
Changing the existing tariff schedule, as Senator Breaux and his supporters
wish to do, would have international as well as domestic implications. Canada
has already said that it would view such a change as a violation of the World
Trade Organization (WTO) agreement and would initiate proceedings against the
United States under the WTO's dispute-resolution provisions. 97 In fact, Canada
89. Heartland By-Products, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 1334-35.
90. Id. at 1339-40.
91. Id. at 1346.
92. CuT Rule 59 is essentially identical to FED. R. Civ. P. 59, except that C1T Rule 59(b) allows a 30-day
period within which a party can move for a rehearing or new trial, while FED. R. Civ. P. 59(b) allows only 10
days.
93. Heartland By-Products, Inc. v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 2d 1339 (Ct Int'l Trade 2000).
94. See, e.g., Matthew T. McGrath et al., International Legal Developments in Review: 1999 Business
Regulation - Customs Law, 34 INT'L LAW. 371, 372-73 (2000).
95. Bill Walsh, Sugar Amendment Gets Sour Reception: Breaux Legislation Dropped from Bill, NEW
ORLEANS TIME-PICAYUNE, May 4, 2000, at Cl, available at 2000 WL 6561041; Rabson, Bitter Battle, supra note
80.
96. Bruce Alpert and Bill Walsh, On the Hill: News from the Louisiana Delegation in the Nation's Capital,
NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Sept. 24, 2000, at 5, available at 2000 WL 21285414.
97. See Mia Rabson, Sugar Growers Protest "Molasses'" Imported By Firm, DETRorr NEWS, Sept. 29, 2000,
available at 2000 WL 4406387. See also Rabson, Bitter Battle, supra note 80; Barrie McKenna, U.S. Sugar
Producer Faces Legal Threat: Bill Would Force Heartland to Pay up to 10,000% Duty, GLOBE & MAIL
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had already taken action in response to Customs' original turnaround on Heart-
land's syrup. 98
Nor is Canada the only major trading partner of the United States to be
unhappy with the existing sugar regime. Mexico, itself a major sugar producer,
has asserted its right under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
to export its surplus sugar production to the United States. This surplus - about
600,000 tons - would equal about 7.5% of United States sugar production.99 The
United States, however, has previously restricted Mexican sugar imports to
25,000 tons per year.'00 Under the terms of NAFTA, it would seem that Mexico
should be able to export its entire surplus to the United States. The United States
claims that a side agreement limits Mexico's quota for the year beginning
October 1, 2000 to 116,000 tons. 01 Mexico has submitted the dispute to a
NAFTA arbitral panel.
10 2
In any event, restrictions on Canadian and Mexican sugar imports can protect
the sugar growers only temporarily. Under NAFTA, all barriers to exports and
imports of sugar among the three NAFTA states should be removed in 2008.103
This will weaken the protectionist regime, but will not undermine it completely,
as Mexican and Canadian surplus sugar production is insufficient to meet U.S.
demand. The price of Mexican sugar is also artificially inflated by a protectionist
regime. 1' 4 Even if both countries dramatically increase production, as they
probably will if assured unlimited access to the U.S. market, U.S. sugar prices
will not be brought close to world prices.
(Toronto), Oct. 5, 2000, at B8 (referring to the "long-running Canada-U.S. trade feud" over the sugar regime).
On an earlier round in this feud, see Honorarium Revealed: Helms'Advocacy for Sugar Was Sweet for Him, Too,
LEGAL TIMES, June 4, 1990, at 2.
98. See Request for Consultations by Canada: United States - Reclassification of Certain Sugar Syrups,
WTO Doc. WT/DS180/1, G/L/317, G/AG/GEN/38 (Sept. 15, 1999), 1999 WL 717952.
99. Mexico Requests NAFTA Dispute Panel on Surplus Sugar, WASH. POST, August 17, 2000, available at
http://tasa.tamu.edu/News46.html (last visited Aug. 11, 2001).
100. See U.S.-Mexico Sugar Dispute Continues, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2000, at http://www.mre.gov.br/acs/
interclip/jornais/outubro/ftimes24a.htm (last visited Aug. 11, 2001) [hereinafter U.S.-Mexico Sugar Dispute].
Mexico's quota had been low since June 1997, when the Mexican government imposed antidumping duties on
high fructose corn syrup from the U.S. Mexico Requests NAFTA Dispute Panel on Surplus Sugar, supra note 99.
101. U.S.-Mexico Sugar Dispute, supra note 100; Rene Pastor, U.S. Urged to Renegotiate Sugar Provisions,
REUTERS ENGLISH NEWS SERVICE, Aug. 6, 2001 (copy on file with author); Key Florida Grower Pushes U.S.
Sugar Program, Reuters English News Service, July 26, 2001, available at http://news.excite.com/printstory/
news/r/010726/13/food-sugar-program (last visited Sept. 20, 2001). Canada's sugar exports to the United States
are limited to 10,300 tons. Mexico Seeks NAFTA Panel in Sweeteners Dispute with U.S., SUGAR NEWS, Aug. 22,
2000, available at http://www.sugar.ca/22Aug00Prt.htm (last visited Aug. 11, 2001) [hereinafter Mexico Seeks
NAFTA Panel]. The side agreement itself is available in North American Free Trade Agreement Supplemental
Agreements and Additional Documents, H.R. Doc. 103-160, Nov. 4, 1993, at 98-101.
102. Mexico Seeks NAFTA Panel, supra note 101; Mexico Requests NAFTA Dispute Panel on Surplus Sugar,
supra note 99; see also U.S. -Mexico Sugar Dispute, supra note 100.
103. See Pastor, supra note 101; see also U.S.-Mexico Sugar Dispute, supra note 100.
104. See Peter Fritsch, Seized Sugar Mills Signal End to PRI's Sweet Deals, WALL ST. J., Sept. 5, 2001, at
A22.
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Everglades sugar growers will do what they can to stop even this limited
removal of trade barriers from happening, though. U.S. Sugar executive vice
president James Terrill has already urged that this provision of NAFTA be
renegotiated, and has enlisted at least one United States representative for the
cause. Disingenuously Terrill says that a common sugar market is "clearly unwise
in a world market of sugar that has a sea of subsidies and total market distortions,
overproduction in some places that shouldn't be producing sugar."' 05
c. Domestic Backlash and Efforts to Protect the Everglades
Heartland produces about one per cent of the sugar produced in the United
States. 10 6 The sugar growers' reaction to the perceived threat, though, is not
excessive; they are aware that their profits depend on protectionism, and
Heartland represents a crack in the regime that has protected them for the past six
decades.10 7 Environmental concerns aside, Heartland is not without its own
allies, however, chiefly manufacturers of sweetened food products: The Indepen-
dent Bakers Association, the Chocolate Manufacturers Association, the Confec-
tioners Association, the Consumer Federation of America, and the Grocery
Manufacturers Association.10 8 In Chicago, for example, Brach's Confections
plans to shut down its candy factories and manufacture candies abroad, not
because of labor or environmental regulations, but because American sugar is too
expensive.109
Sugar is a non-partisan, or at least bipartisan, issue. Sugar subsidies enjoy
support from Republicans and Democrats alike, and sugar growers contribute
heavily to candidates from both parties. Sugar's opponents are equally bipartisan.
Former Senate Agriculture Committee chair Richard Lugar (R-Indiana) says
"Events of the past year indicate that the sugar program is becoming increasingly
unmanageable and that radical reforms are needed urgently."1' 0 Chicago Mayor
Richard Daley, a prominent Democrat,"' favors a complete end to sugar
subsidies." 2 Rationally enough, most elected officials' stance seems to depend
105. Pastor, supra note 101.
106. Heartland produces, or imports, about 125,000 tons per year. Rabson, Bitter Battle, supra note 80.
107. Pepe Fanjul says "Some people have come up with the idea of blends like stuffed molasses... I think
that loophole has to be closed." Key Florida Grower Pushes U.S. Sugar Program, supra note 101.
108. U.S. Bakers Urge Congress to Reject High Sugar Syrup Tariff, Dow JONES COMMODFTIS SERVICE, Oct.
24, 2000 (copy on file with author); Bruce Alpert & Bill Walsh, On the Hill: News from the Louisiana
Delegation in the Nation's Capital, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Oct. 29, 2000, at 4, available at 2000 WL
21290927. Sugar refiners are in an awkward position, as they are currently dependent on United States growers
for business but hurt by high prices. See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 49; Monahan, supra note 3, at 341.
109. Fisher, supra note 49.
110. Sugar Industry Faces Big Test, supra note 46.
111. Since 1999, the office of mayor of Chicago has technically been a non-partisan one. See the Chicago
Public Library's page on Mayor Daley, at http://www.chipublib.org/004chicago/mayors/daley2.html (last
visited Aug. 11, 2001).
112. Sugar Industry Faces Big Test, supra note 46.
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on whether the businesses within their districts are net producers or net consum-
ers of sugar.
Attempts to fight the damage to the Everglades with additional non-market
solutions and even heavier government intervention also have a long and
unsuccessful history. Dexter Lehtinen's celebrated lawsuit 1 3 eventually fizzled
out, leaving the Everglades as endangered as ever."l4 Bruce Babbitt's appoint-
ment as Secretary of the Interior, initially hailed as a triumph for environmental-
ists and environmentalism, led to a settlement that pleased no one but sugar
growers and helped the Everglades not at all." l5 Al Gore's bold talk of a
one-cent-per-pound tax on sugar cane growers" 16 ultimately led to an angry - and
apparently effective - thirty-minute phone call from Alfonso Fanjul to then-
President Clinton.1 1 7 After five years, yet another "compromise" Everglades
restoration plan has failed to restore the Everglades and amounts to little more
than an additional bailout for sugar growers.' 18 Perhaps the brightest hope of all,
the proposed Sugar Stabilization Act of 1989, was never enacted." 9
III. CONCLUSION: BAD ECONOMICS IS BAD FOR THE ENVIRONMENT
Environmentalists have a distressing tendency to view economists as en-
emies.' 20 Yet many environmental problems, such as pollution, result from the
113. The lawsuit, while complex, essentially sought to require the South Florida Water Management District
to supply more and cleaner water to the Everglades. United States v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 922 F.2d 704
(lth Cit. 1991); cert. denied, 502 U.S. 953 (1991); on remand, 847 F. Supp. 1567 (S.D. Fla. 1992); aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 28 F.3d 1563 (1lth Cir. 1994); cert. denied 514 U.S. 1107 (1995). See, e.g., Fla. Sugar Cane
League, Inc. v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 617 So. 2d 1065 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Miccosukee Tribe of
Indians v. Fla. Dept. of Envtl. Protection, 656 So. 2d 505 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Miccosukee Tribe of
Indians of Fla. v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency, 105 F.3d 599 (1lth Cir. 1997).
114. See generally Roberts, supra note 3; Lisa Gibbs, Federal Suit to Protect Everglades Bogs Down;
Florida Blames Its Hired Guns from D.C. Office of Skadden, Arps, LEGAL TIMES, July 8, 1991, at 6.
115. See, e.g., De'Ann Weimer, How Sugar Baron Got a Sweet Deal from Babbitt; Environmentalists Call
Everglades Cleanup Pact a Sellout to Polluter LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 30, 1993, at 2; Alfred R. Light, The Myth of
Everglades Settlement, 11 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 55 (1998).
116. See Clinton Administration Proposes Florida Sugar Tax to Fund Everglades Restoration, WEST'S
LEGAL NEWS, Feb. 21, 1996, at 900, available at 1996 WL 258651.
117. The phone call is not, unfortunately, famous for its impact on the Everglades, but for its role in the
investigation of President Clinton's relationship with Monica Lewinsky.
118. Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996, supra note 37, at § 390. On the
unimpressive results thus far, see, e.g., Roberts, supra note 3, at 68 ("'They've turned 'restoration' into a huge
water-supply project,' gripes Joe Browder, Washington environmental consultant and a longtime Everglades
advocate."). See also, e.g., untitled editorial, ST. PETERSBURG (FLA.) TIMES, Dec. 6, 1999, at 10-A ("Gov. Jeb
Bush should have appointed more scientists and environmentalists and fewer sugar-industry representatives and
politicians to the Governor's Commission on the Everglades.").
119. The Act would have gradually reduced the support price from eighteen cents to twelve cents per pound,
and would have increased the import quota by a minimum of 500,000 tons per year for the years 1990 through
1993. Sugar Supply Stabilization Act (not enacted) §§2(b)(2), 3(a)(1), S. 552, 101st Cong., (lst Sess. 1989);
H.R. 1055, 101st Cong., (Ist Sess. 1989).
120. For more on the links between free trade and the environment, see, e.g., EDWARD M. GRAHAM,
FIGHTING THE WRONG ENEMY: ANTIGLOBAL ACTIVISTS AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 131-64 (2000);
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simple absence of an effective mechanism to compel the problem-causer to
internalize externalities. Others, such as the ongoing destruction of the Ever-
glades, are the result of government intervention to prevent the market from
removing the destructive businesses. 121 Without the existing protectionist re-
gime, sugar industry revenues would fall by up to U.S. $2 billion per year.
Without the construction and continuing operation of the elaborate and costly
EAA drainage system, sugar cane could not be grown in the EAA at all. The
federal government can solve a large part of the Everglades problem through
inaction. Simple passivity - that is, refusal to impose and enforce price supports
and a protectionist quota/tariff regime - will bring about the gradual demise of
sugar production in the Everglades. An active solution - undoing the EAA
drainage project - would have a one-time cost, but would speed that demise and
eliminate the danger that some other crop might replace sugar cane in the EAA.
The end of the sugar plantations in the Everglades should not be mourned.
Sugar in the Everglades is not truly an industry, but a con game; as a nation we
have been convinced to pay nearly three times as much as the rest of the world for
sugar, producing an unnecessary surplus when all of our needs could easily be
met by low-cost imports. Sugar is not that important a product; there is no
national security interest in maintaining a domestic supply. In fact, sugar,
although not as bad as tobacco, is a harmful product; it causes tooth decay and is
linked to a host of health problems, including obesity and diabetes.
Nor would the growers be severely harmed, unless the reduction of profits to
levels experienced by other sectors of agriculture can be counted as harm.
Flo-Sun would be able to import and sell all of its Dominican sugar in the United
States. U.S. Sugar would be similarly encouraged to move its production to less
environmentally sensitive areas. 122 Elsewhere, sugar beet farmers would switch
to other crops - often, the crops they grew before the government paid them to
switch to sugar beets. In California, for example, sugar beets are only marginally,
and artificially, competitive. 
123
Free trade has already struck a few blows against the sugar subsidies. GATT
and the WTO have forced the United States to admit a few imports, and to replace
the absolute quota system with a two-tiered tariff regime that has the same effect
but might be simpler to modify. The decision in Heartland By-Products has kept
Steve Charnovitz, Free Trade, Fair Trade, Green Trade: Defogging the Debate, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 459
(1994).
121. The United States is not alone in inadvertently financing environmental destruction through agricultural
subsidies. The European Union is currently experiencing environmental problems as a result of olive-oil
subsidies. See Glut, Fraud and Eco-Damage, EcONOMIST, June 28, 2001.
122. Nonetheless, the growers, who grow subsidized crops on land that is only usable because the federal
government has made it so, will undoubtedly argue that the dismantling of the irrigation system constitutes a
taking. See Sharon S. Tisher, Everglades Restoration: A Constitutional Takings Analysis, 10 LAND USE & ENVTL
L. 1, 2 (1994).
123. Monahan, supra note 3, at 339.
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open a door for sugar imports outside the quota system, and NAFTA should
eventually open the United States market to imports from Canada and Mexico.
This is a start, but not enough to save the Everglades. Only a truly free market
in sugar will do that. The sugar subsidy program's next major point of vulnerabil-
ity will be at the end of 2002, when the 1996 Farm Bill expires.12 4 Before that
time, of course, it will inevitably be renewed, but perhaps there is a chance that it
can be renewed without insanely generous subsidies for sugar producers. Turning
off the spigot that keeps money flowing to the sugar growers will make it possible
to turn on the flow of water from Lake Okeechobee to the Everglades.
Globalization of trade, seen by some environmental activists as an undiluted
evil, is perhaps the only means to save Florida's Everglades. While demand for
sugar may remain constant, resulting in more sugar production elsewhere, not all
sugar-producing regions are as environmentally sensitive as the Everglades.
While it may be naive to hope that removing trade barriers will always lead to
environmentally beneficial results, in the case of the Everglades, such action will.
124. 7 U.S.C.A. § 1736b (1999); Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996, supra note 37, §
217.
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